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Proof that Wittgenstein is correct about Gödel 
In order to understand that Wittgenstein's refutation of Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness 
Theorem is correct we must fill in some details of the notion of a formal system that 
Wittgenstein had in mind. Expressions of language encoding analytical knowledge are 
only true if they have been defined to be true or valid deductions from true premises 
prove that they are true. When these relations are formalized as formal proofs to 
theorem consequences then Provable(x) cannot possibly diverge from True(x). 
To make things simple we divide the set of all knowledge into expressions of language 
that can be verified as completely true entirely based on their relation to each other 
(analytical) from those expressions of language that have some aspect of their truth 
value derived from their relation to things in the world (empirical). 
Analytical knowledge has two consituent elements: 
(1) Expressions of language are stipulated to be true.
≅ AXIOMS: are stipulated relations between finite strings that are defined to have the 
semantic property of Boolean true. (see also Curry 1977:45). 
(2) Relations between expressions of language stipulated to be truth preserving. 
≅ rules-of-inference: Valid deduction expressed as relations between finite strings. 
Validity and Soundness   https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/   
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it 
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false. 
Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid.
A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are 
actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
Analytical knowledge: The set of all knowledge that can be completely expressed 
using language and totally verified as true entirely based on its meaning thus not 
requiring any sense data from the sense organs. This specification divides the analytic 
versus synthetic distinction overcoming Quine's objections. All of mathematics meets 
this specification. 
Modal Logic
◊P ↔ ¬□¬P    //  Possibly(P) ↔ ¬Necessarily(¬P)
□P ↔ ¬◊¬P    //  Necessarily(P) ↔ ¬Possibly(¬P) 
∀P (P ∈ Analytical_Knowledge(P) ↔ □P)
Modal logic precisely defines the English words: Necessarily and Possibily in terms of 
each other. The Possible Worlds aspect of modal logic is not required because we are 
only examining relations between expressions of language to each other. 
---1---
When it is understood that every element of the set of analytical knowledge is either a 
semantic tautology (defined to be true) or deduced from semantic tautologies then we 
see that these semantic tautologies and deductive rules-of-inference can be expressed 
as relations between finite strings. This unifies sound deduction with formal proofs to 
theorem consequenes. 
∀x(True(x) ≡ □x ≡ Conclusion_of_Sound_Deduction(x) ≡ Theorem(x))
Now that we can screen out semantic paradoxes as ill-formed truth bearers, we can 
define the universal truth predicate that Tarski misconstrued to be impossible as: 
Wittgenstein definitions of True() and False()  
‘True in Russell’s system’ means, as was said: proved in Russell’s system; and ‘false in 
Russell’s system’ means: the opposite has been proved in Russell’s system. 
(Wittgenstein 1983,118-119) Formalized by Olcott as: 
LHS := RHS means LHS is defined as the RHS
∀x (True(RS, x)  := (RS ⊢ x)) // x is a theorem of RS
∀x (False(RS, x) := (RS ⊢ ¬x)) // ¬x is a theorem of RS
Wittgenstein’s minimal essence of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem sentence
“I have constructed a proposition (I will use ‘P’ to designate it) in Russell’s symbolism, 
and by means of certain definitions and transformations it can be so interpreted that it 
says ‘P is not provable in Russell’s system’. (Wittgenstein 1983,118-119)
Formalized by Olcott: P ↔ (RS ⊬ P)
When we sum up the results of Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness Theorem by formalizing 
Wittgenstein’s verbal specification such that this formalization meets Gödel's own 
sufficiency requirement: “Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a 
similar undecidability proof.” then we can see that Gödel's famous logic sentence is only
unprovable in PA because it is untrue in PA because it specifies the logical equivalence 
to self contradiction in PA. 
Since the Wittgenstein-Olcott axiom schema define True(RS, x) as Provable(RS, x) then
¬Provable(RS, x) would be defined as ¬True(RS, x). This means that the Wittgenstein-
Olcott minimal essence of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem <IS> The Liar Paradox. 
The Formalized Liar Paradox says that P is materially equivalent to Not True.
The truth table shows that this is self-contradictory. 
P  ↔   ¬True(P) P  ↔  RS⊬P 
T   F       F T   F       F 
F   F       T F   F       T   
---2---
The truth table of minimal essence of the 1931 Incompleteness theorem is identical to 
the truth table of the Liar Paradox because the third columns of these truth tables are 
stipulated by the Wittgenstein-Olcott axiom schema to mean exactly the same thing. 
The failure of logical equivalence shows that both P and ¬P are contradicted (false) 
(in the above formula) thus meeting the [epistemological antinomy] sufficiency condition 
that Gödel stipulated for proof equivalence: “14 Every epistemological antinomy can 
likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof.” (Gödel 1931:40)
The fact that self-contradictory sentences specified in the language of a formal system 
cannot be proven in that formal system does not make the formal system itself 
incomplete or inconsistent as long as unprovable (from axioms) is construed as untrue. 
At the most abstract level of analysis: 
Conceptual Truth is ONLY semantic relations between concepts that can always be 
expressed as[1] syntactic relations between finite strings[2] thereby logically entailing 
that truth cannot possibly ever diverge from provability.
[1] Forming an isomorphism between semantic and syntactic relations: 
∀x (True(x) ≅ Provable(x))
[2] Such as words, word phrases or predicate logic expressions.
Examples:
"one" [is a] "Integer"
"cats" [are] "Animals"
"cats" [have] "legs"
"2 + 3" [equals] "5"
"A  B" "↔" "B  A"∧ ∧
To make the above abstraction more concrete we focus on the single relation between 
concepts of [sound deduction] from the sound deductive inference model. Sound 
deduction begins with stipulated truth, applies a sequence of truth preserving 
operations, thus necessarily ends up with truth.
Truth ONLY comes from:
(1) Stipulated truth (the definitions of the meaning of words)
(2) Applying a sequence of truth preserving operations to stipulated truth.
Truth ALWAYS comes from:
(1) Stipulated truth (the definitions of the meaning of words)
(2) Applying a sequence of truth preserving operations to stipulated truth.
---3---
When we construe a formal systems axioms to essentially be stipulated truth then this 
same formal systems theorems would also be true because they were derived by 
applying truth preserving operations to its axioms. Since this is the way that Truth really 
works we have proven that true can never diverge from provability. 
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Appendix
Curry, Haskell 1977. Foundations of Mathematical Logic. New York: Dover Publications,  45
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite class {E} of statements, which we call elementary 
statements...
The statements of {E} are called elementary statements to distinguish them from other statements which 
we may form from them or about them in the U language...
Then the elementary statements which belong to {T} we shall call the elementary theorems of {T}; we also
say that these elementary statements are true for {T}. Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an 
elementary statement which is true. A theory is thus a way of picking out from the statements of {E} a 
certain subclass of true statements… 
The terminology which has just been used implies that the elementary statements are not such that their 
truth and falsity are known to us without reference to {T}. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1983. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Appendix III), 118-119. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press 
8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: "I have constructed
a proposition (I will use 'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
and by means of certain definitions and transformations it can be so
interpreted that it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'. Must I
not say that this proposition on the one hand is true, and on the other
hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; then it is true that it is
provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it
is proved that it is not provable. Thus it can only be true, but 
unprovable. "
  Just as we ask: " 'provable' in what system?", so we must also ask:
" 'true' in what system?" 'True in Russell's system' means, as was
said: proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:
the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-Now what does
your "suppose it is false" mean? In the Russell sense it means 'suppose
the opposite is proved in Russell's system'; if that is your assumption,
you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. 
And by 'this interpretation' I understand the translation into
this English sentence.-If you assume that the proposition is provable
in Russell's system, that means it' is true in the Russell sense, and the
interpretation "P is not provable" again has to be given up. If you
assume that the proposition is true in the Russell sense, the same thing
follows. Further: if the proposition is supposed to be false in some
other than the Russell sense, then it does not contradict this for it to
be proved in Russell's system. (What is called "losing" in chess may
constitute winning in another game.) 
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